The Optimal Design of Social Security Benefits by Shinichi Nishiyama & Kent Smetters
     Working Paper 
             











The Optimal Design of Social Security Benefits 















Shinichi Nishiyama  
Georgia State University 
 
Kent Smetters 








Michigan Retirement Research Center 
University of Michigan 
P.O. Box 1248 










This work was supported by a grant from the Social Security Administration through the 
Michigan Retirement Research Center (Grant # 10-P-98362-5-04).  The findings and conclusions 
expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the Social Security 
Administration, any agency of the Federal government, or the Michigan Retirement Research 
Center.   
 
Regents of the University of Michigan 
Julia Donovan Darrow, Ann Arbor; Laurence B. Deitch, Bingham Farms; Olivia P. Maynard, Goodrich; Rebecca 
McGowan, Ann Arbor; Andrea Fischer Newman, Ann Arbor; Andrew C. Richner, Grosse Pointe Park; S. Martin 
Taylor, Gross Pointe Farms; Katherine E. White, Ann Arbor; Mary Sue Coleman, ex officio  
 
The Optimal Design of Social Security Benefits 
 
 




The United States Social Security system is fairly unique in that it explicitly allows for a 
progressive formulation of retirement benefits by assigning a larger replacement rate to workers 
with small pre-retirement wages. In contrast, the public pension systems in other countries often 
replace a constant fraction of pre-retirement wages, although the length of the “averaging period" 
is typically shorter relative to the U.S. This paper examines the ex-ante optimal U.S. Social 
Security benefit structure using the model developed in Nishiyama and Smetters (2007). On one 
hand, progressivity in the benefit structure provides risk sharing against shocks that are difficult 
to insure privately. On the other hand, progressivity introduces various marginal tax rates that 
distort labor supply. Rather surprisingly, we find that the ex-ante best U.S. Social Security 
replacement rate structure is fairly “flat.” Intuitively, the relatively long averaging period used in 
the U.S. system formulation already provides some insurance against negative idiosyncratic 

















This paper uses the model developed in Nishiyama and Smetters 2007 (herein NS2007) to derive
the optimal structure of the U.S. Social Security system. Whereas NS2007 analyzed the efﬁciency of
different, speciﬁc alternative designs of the U.S. Social Security system, the current paper attempts
to derive the ex-ante best system design among a larger range of different potential Social Security
formulations. This type of experiment naturally has many “degrees of freedom” that could potentially
lead to a search over a massive parameter space. So we limit our experiments to (1) stationary ﬁscal
policies; (2) pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced systems and (3) a proportional payroll tax set equal to the current
statutory value. These restrictions naturally allow us to focus on ﬁnding the ex-ante optimal steady-
state function that translates previous earned wages into a Social Security beneﬁt.
By “ex ante optimal,” we mean that we search for the best policy conditional on households not yet
entering the workforce. Since these households have not yet realized their initial productive capacities,
this perspective is sometimes called the “Rawlsian” experiment. In contrast, NS2007 analyzed Hick-
sian efﬁciency gains or losses associated with different policies from an “interim” perspective where
households have already realized their initial productivity types, which is highly correlated with the
productivity earned throughout the rest of their lifecycle. The “ex ante” position, however, naturally
places more emphasis on the importance of risk since even the initial household productivity type has
not been materialized. So households in the ex-ante position should tend to care more about reducing
that uncertainty relative to reducing the economic distortions associated policies that reduce that risk.
The current U.S. Social Security beneﬁt formula is progressive in the sense that it gives a retiree
who had relatively smaller average wages over his pre-retirement working years a larger replacement
rate relative to a retiree who had a higher average wage rate. Very few other countries use a similar
progressive formulation, although some countries with partially privatized systems provide a ﬂat de-
mogrant inside of the reduced public pension systems, which, in itself, is highly progressive. The U.S.
Social Security system is also fairly unique in that it imputes a retiree’s pre-retirement average wage
using a fairly long working history by selecting the worker’s “best 35” working years. In contrast,
many other countries compute a worker’s average earnings across their wages earned just three to 10
years before retirement. To be sure, focusing on wages earned toward the end of the lifecycle tends to
“bias upward” the worker’s computed average wage. But, it also places more risk on a worker’s unin-
surable wages earned during that period; moreover, any average upward bias can be mostly undone
by simply scaling down the replacement rate factor. In contrast, a longer average period itself reducessome idiosyncratic risk but focuses more on riskiness of the earning process; it cannot be as easily
reversed by scaling down the replacement rate factors.
But is all the progressivity in the U.S. Social Security system ex-ante optimal? On one hand,
progressivity in the beneﬁt structure provides risk sharing against shocks that are difﬁcult to insure
privately. On the other hand, progressivity introduces various marginal tax rates that distort labor
supply.
Rather surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the ex-ante best U.S. Social Security replacement rate structure
is fairly “ﬂat” – not very progressive – even though households face a considerable amount of uncer-
tainty in the ex ante position. Intuitively, the relatively long averaging period used in the U.S. system
formulation already provides sufﬁcient insurance against negative idiosyncratic shocks but in a manner
that creates lower labor supply distortions than a progressive beneﬁt formula. Section II describes the
model while Section III explains the calibration of the model. Section IV presents simulation results
while Section V concludes.
II. Model
Following NS2007, our model has three sectors: heterogeneous households with elastic labor sup-
ply; a competitive representative ﬁrm with constant-returns-to-scale production technology; and a gov-
ernment with a full commitment technology. We ﬁrst describe the household sector before .
II.A. The Household Sector
Households are heterogeneous with respect to the following variables: age i; working ability e
(measured by hourly wages); beginning-of-period wealth holdings a; and, average historical earnings
b that determine their Social Security beneﬁts. Each year, a large number (normalized to unity) of
new households of age 20 enter the economy. Population grows at a constant rate ν. A household
of age i observes an idiosyncratic working ability shock e at the beginning of each year and chooses
its optimal consumption c, working hours h, and end-of-period wealth holding a0, taking as given the
government’s policy schedule and future factor prices. At the end of each year, a fraction of households
die according to standard mortality rates; no one lives beyond age 109. For simplicity, all households
represent two-earner married couples of the same age.
Let s denote the individual state of a household,
s =( i,e,a,b),where i ∈ I = {20,...,109} is the household’s age, e ∈ E =[ emin,e max] is its age-dependent
working ability (the hourly wage), a ∈ A =[ amin,a max] is its beginning-of-period wealth, and b ∈
B =[ bmin,b max] is its average historical earnings for Social Security purposes.1
Let S denote the state of the economy:
S =( x(s),W G),
where xt(s) is the joint distribution of households where s ∈ I ×E ×A×B. WG is the net wealth of
the rest of the government. Let Ψ denote the known government policy schedule:
Ψ = {WG,C G,τI(.),τP(.),tr SS(s),tr LS(s)},
where CG,s is government consumption, τI,s(.) is an income tax function, τP,s(.) is a payroll tax func-
tion for Social Security (OASDI) and trSS,s(s) is a Social Security beneﬁt function. The speciﬁcations
of these functions are described below.
The household’s problem is described recursively as














{w · eh +( 1+r)a − τI(w · eh,r · a),tr SS(s)) (2)
− τP(w · eh)+trSS(s) − c} ≥ a0
min(s),
a =0if i =2 0 ,a ≥ 0 if i ≥ 65,
where the utility function, ui(.), takes the Cobb-Douglas form nested within a time-separable isoelastic
speciﬁcation,
(3) ui(c,h)=
{((1 + ni/2)−ζc)α(hmax − h)1−α}1−γ
1 − γ
;
γ is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion; ni is the number of dependent children at the parents’ agei;
1The average historical earnings are used to calculate the Social Security beneﬁts of each household. The variable b
approximates the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) multiplied by 12 as of age i.ζ is the “adult equivalency scale" that converts the consumption by children into their adult equivalent
amounts; and, hmax is the maximum working hours. Wages are stochastic and follow a Markov process
that is described in more detail below. In the “representative agent” economy setting described below,
wages are assumed to be perfectly insurable; in the “heterogenous agent” case, wages are assumed
to be uninsurable. We also consider an economy with and without the ability to annuitize household
assets.
The constant β is the rate of time preference; φi is the survival rate at the end of age i; w is the
wage rate per efﬁciency unit of labor (accordingly, w · eh is total labor compensation at age i); and rt
is the rate of return to capital. Individual variables of the model are normalized by the exogenous rate
of labor augmenting technological change, μ. Our choice for ui(.) is consistent with the conditions
that are necessary for the existence of a long-run steady state in the presence of constant population
growth. Hence, μ is also equal to the per-capita growth rate of output and capital in steady state. The
term β(1 + μ)α(1−γ), therefore, is the growth-adjusted rate of time preference.
a0
min(s) is the state-contingent minimum level of end-of-period wealth that is sustainable, that is,
even if the household receives the worst possible shocks in future working abilities.2 At the beginning
of the next period, the state of this household when private annuity markets do not exist becomes
(4) s0 =( i +1 ,e 0,a 0 + q,b0),
where qt denotes accidental bequests that a household receives at the end of the period.
The average historical earnings for this household, b, follows the following process,
(5) b0 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if i ≤ 24
1
i−24{(i − 25)b wt
wt−1 + min(wteh/2,weh max,t)} if 25 ≤ i ≤ 59
b/(1 + μ) if i ≥ 60
,
wherew·ehmax is the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax cap, whichis $80,400
in 2001. U.S. Social Security beneﬁts are computed on the basis of the highest 35 years of earnings.




min,t(s) is allowed to be negative but cannot exceed in magnitude the present value of the worst possible
future labor income stream at maximum working hours, sometimes called the “natural borrowing limit.” Although not shown
explicitly in equation (2) in order to save on notation, any borrowing (i.e., a
0 < 0)b ya na g e n ta g ei at time t must be done
at rate (1 + rt)/φi − 1 in order cover the chance that they will die before repaying their loan.Let x(s) denote the population distribution of households, and let X(s) be the corresponding cu-
mulative distribution. The distribution of households is adjusted by the steady-state population growth
rate, ν. The population of age 20 households is normalized to unity in the baseline economy along the
balanced growth path, that is, Z
E
dX(20,e,0,0) = 1.
Let 1[a=y] be an indicator function that returns 1 if a = y a n d0i fa 6= y. Then, the law of motion of







where πi,i+1 denotes the transition probability of working ability from age i to age i +1 .
The aggregate value of accidental bequests each period is deterministic in our model because all
risks are idiosyncratic and, therefore, uncorrelated across households. Accidental bequests could,
therefore, be simply distributed equally and deterministically across all surviving households, as in
previous work. That approach, however, suffers from two shortcomings. First, households would an-
ticipate receiving a bequest with certainty, thereby artiﬁcially crowding out their pre-bequest savings.
Thissavingsreductionwouldbemitigatedifbequestswererandom. Second, empirically, theinequality
of bequests is important in generating a realistic measure of wealth inequality.
Our alternative strategy, therefore, distributes bequests randomly to surviving working-age house-





















where qt is the average wealth left by deceased households, and η is the ratio of deceased household
to the surviving working-age households. In other words, a constant fraction η of households across
all income groups will receive a bequest of size qt while a constant fraction (1 −η) of households will
not. But ex ante, each household only knows it will receive a bequest with probability η.3
3Future work could go even a step further and allow for a correlation between a household’s own income, age and the size
of the bequest that they receive. At this point, however, we are not aware of any careful empirical work that would allow us
to include this correlation into our model.II.B. Government
Government tax revenue consists of federal income tax TI, and payroll tax for Social Security
























(1 + μ)(1 + ν)
{(1 + r)WG,t + TI + TP − TrSS − CG},
where CG is government consumption and WG,t+1 = WG,t in steady state.
II.C. Measuring Ex-Ante Optimality





Our experiments ﬁnd the construction of Social Security beneﬁts that maximizes the value of Ω.
II.D. Aggregation and Production













In a closed economy, capital stock is equal to national wealth, that is, K = W, and gross national
product Y is determined by a constant-returns-to-scale production function,
Y = F(K,L).
The proﬁt-maximizing condition for this competitive ﬁrm is
FK(K,L)=r + δ, (13)
FL(K,L)=w, (14)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
II.E. Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Deﬁnition Recursive Competitive Equilibrium. Let s =( i,e,a,b) be the individual state of house-
holds, let St =( xt(s),W LS,t,W G,t) be the state of the economy, and let Ψt be the government policy
schedule known at the beginning of year t,
Ψt = {WLS,s+1,W G,s+1,C G,s,τI,s(.),τP,s(.),tr SS,s(s),tr LS,s(s)}∞
s=t.
A series of factor prices {rs,w s}∞
s=t, accidental bequests {qs}∞
s=t, the policy variables
{WLS,s+1,W G,s+1,C G,s,tr LS,s(s)}∞
s=t, the parameters of policy functions {ϕs}∞
s=t, the value func-
tion of households {v(s,Ss;Ψs)}∞
s=t, the decision rule of households
{d(s,Ss;Ψs)}∞




s = t,...,∞, each household solves the utility maximization problem (1)–(5) taking Ψt as given; theﬁrm solves its proﬁt maximization problem, the capital and labor market conditions (11)–(14) clear,
and the government policy schedule satisﬁes (6)–(9). In steady-state,
St+1 = St
for all t and s ∈ I × E × A × B.
III. Calibration
III.A. Households
The coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, γ, is assumed to be 2.0. The number of dependent chil-
dren at the parents’ age i, ni, is calculated using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 2003
Family Data as shown in Table III. The “adult equivalency scale," ζ, is set at 0.6.4 As discussed later,
β is chosen to hit a target capital-output ratio that produces an interest rate of 6.25 percent in the initial
steady state. The maximum working hours of husband and wife, hmax, is set at 8,760, equal to 12 hours
per day per person × 365 days × two persons. A smaller value for hmax would reduce the effective
labor supply elasticity, and tend to reduce the gains from privatization. The parameter α is chosen so
that the average working hours of households between ages 20 and 64 equals 3,576 hours in the initial
steady-state economy, the average number of hours supplied by married households in the 2003 PSID.
Many of these parameters are summarized in Tables I and II. The parameters shown in Table I are the
same for all of our privatization simulations. The working ability in this calibration corresponds to the
hourly wage (labor income per hour) of each household in the 2003 PSID, and is discussed in more
detail in NS2007. Table IV shows the eight discrete levels of working abilities of ﬁve-year age cohorts.
Using PSID, we estimate Markov transition matrixes that specify the probabilities that a household’s
wage will move from one level to a different level the next year.The population growth rate ν is set
to one percent per year while the survival rate φi at the end of age i = {20,...,109} are the weighted
averages of the male and female survival rates, as calculated by the Social Security Administration
[2001]. The survival rates at the end of age 109 are replaced by zero, thereby capping the maximum
length of life.
III.B. Production
4Hence, a married couple with two dependent children must consume about 52 percent (i.e., 2
0.6 =1 .517)m o r et h a na
married couple with no children to attain the same level of utility, ceteris paribus.Capital K is the sum of private ﬁxed assets and government ﬁxed assets. In 2000, private ﬁxed
assets were $21,165 billion, government ﬁxed assets were $5,743 billion, and the public held about
$3,410 billion of government debt.5 Government net wealth, therefore, is set equal to 9.5 percent of
total private wealth in the initial steady-state economy. Moreover, the time preference parameter β is
chosen in each variant of our model explored below so that the capital-GDP ratio in the initial steady
state economy is 2.74, the empirical value in 2000.
Production takes the Cobb-Douglas form,
F(K,L)=AKθL1−θ.
where, recall, L is the sum of working hours in efﬁciency units. The capital share of output is given by
θ =1−
Compensation of Employees +( 1− θ) × Proprietors’ Income
National Income + Consumption of Fixed Capital
.
The value of θ in 2000 was 0.30.6 The annual per-capita growth rate μ is assumed to be 1.8 percent,
the average rate between 1869 to 1996 (Barro, 1997). Total factor productivity A is set at 0.949, which
normalizes the wage (per efﬁcient labor unit) to unity.




− μ − ν.
In 2000, private gross ﬁxed investment accounted for 17.2 percent of GDP, and government (federal
and state) gross investment accounted for 3.3 percent of GDP.7 With a capital-output ratio of 2.74, the
ratio of gross investment to ﬁxed capital is 7.5 percent. Subtracting productivity and population growth
rates, the annual depreciation rate is 4.7 percent.
III.C. The Government
Federal income tax and state and local taxes are assumed to be at the level in year 2001 before
the passage of the “Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001” (EGTRRA). Since
households in our model are assumed to be married, we use a standard deduction of $7,600. However,
5Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
6Ibid.
7Ibid.following Altig et al. [2001], we allow higher income households to itemize deductions when it is
more valuable to do so, and we assume that the value of the itemized deduction increases linearly
in the Adjusted Gross Income.8 The additional exemption per dependent person is $2,900 where the
number of dependent children is consistent with Table III. Table V shows the statutory marginal tax
r a t e sb e f o r eE G T R R A . 9 As noted earlier, a household’s labor income in this calibration includes the
imputed payroll tax paid by its employer. Thus, taxable income is obtained by subtracting the employer
portion of payroll tax from labor income.
The standard deduction, the personal exemption, and all tax brackets grow with productivity over
time so that there is no real bracket creep; this indexing is also needed for the initial economy to be
in steady state. Since the effective tax rate on capital income is reduced by investment tax incentives,
accelerated depreciation and other factors [Auerbach 1996], the tax function is further adjusted so that
the cross-sectional average tax rate on capital income is about 25 percent lower than the average tax on
labor income.10 In 2000, the ratio of total individual federal income tax revenue (not including Social
Security and Medicare taxes) to GDP was 0.102 and the ratio of corporate income tax to GDP was
0.021. Each statutory federal income tax rate shown in Table V, therefore, is multiplied by ϕI so that
tax revenue (including corporate income tax) totals 12.3 percent of GDP in the initial steady state. The
adjustment factor is 0.815. State and local income taxes are modeled parsimoniously with a 4.0 percent
ﬂat tax on income above the deduction and exemption levels used at the federal level.
The tax rate levied on employees for Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) is
12.4 percent, and the tax rate for Medicare (HI) is 2.9 percent. In 2001, employee compensation above
$80,400 was not taxable for OASDI. (See Table VI.) Workers with wages above $80,400, therefore,
don’t face a marginal tax or distortions from the Social Security system.
Social Security beneﬁts are based on each worker’s Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME),
b/12, and the replacement rate schedule shown in Table VII. The replacement rates are 90 percent for
the ﬁrst $561, 32 percent for amounts between $561 and $3,381, and 15 percent for amounts above
$3,381. Social Security, therefore, is progressive in that a worker’s beneﬁtr e l a t i v et oA I M E( t h e
“replacement rate") is decreasing in the AIME.
8In particular, the deduction taken by a household is the greater of the standard deduction and 0.0755×AGI, or
max{$7600,0.0755×AGI}.
9The key qualitative results reported herein are unaffected if the tax function were instead modeled as net taxes, that is,
after substracting transfers indicated in the Statistics of Income.
10T h i sr e l a t i v er e d u c t i o nt ot h et a xr a t eo nc a p i t a li sc o m m o n l yu s e db yt h eC o n g r e s s i o n a lB u d g e tO f ﬁce, and it balances
the legal tax preferences given to capital versus the legal tax beneﬁts given to labor, including tax-preferred fringe beneﬁts.The U.S. OASDI also pays spousal, survivors’ and disability beneﬁts in addition to the standard
retirement beneﬁt described above. Indeed, retiree beneﬁts accounted for only 69.1 percent of total
OASDI beneﬁts in December 2000.11 OASDI beneﬁts, therefore, are adjusted upward by the pro-
portional adjustment factor ϕSS so that total beneﬁt payments equal total payroll tax revenue. The
adjustment factor ϕSS equals about 1.46 in our model. This adjustment proportionally distributes non-
retiree OASDI payments across retirees.
IV. Policy Experiments
We now examine the impact of changing the progressivity of the Social Security beneﬁt on various
steady-state macro-economic variables as well as ex-ante efﬁciency. We assume that private annuity
markets do not exist, and so Social Security provides risk sharing over both uninsurable idiosyncratic
wages earned overthe household’slifetime as well as annuity protection. The change in welfare that we





,w h e r eΩ0 represents the initial steady-
state ex-ante welfare and ΩNEW is the weﬂare after the change in the social security beneﬁt function.
Scaling by 1/(1 − γ) allows us to interpret the induced welfare changes as the percentage change in
full (potential) lifetime income for the agent in the ex-ante (pre-working) position.
The results are reported in Table VIII. Run 1 corresponds to the current baseline, and so there are
no change in any variable, by deﬁnition. The remaining runs then alter the Social Security replacement
rate for the ﬁrst $561 from 90% to different values: 45% (Run 2), 135% (Run 3) and 180% (Run 4).
We pay special attention to this ﬁrst “bendpoint” in the replacement rate function because it effectively
controls most of Social Security’s progressivity under the balanced-budget contraint that keeps the
payroll tax rate constant. In particular, the larger the value of the ﬁrst bendpoint, the smaller the other
bendpoints must become in order to achieve pay-as-you-go balance with the current payroll tax rate.
So, in effect, the ﬁrst bendpoint alone largely determines the progressivity of the entire beneﬁtf o r m u l a .
However, any policy change also produces additional general-equilibrium effects through factor
prices, including interest rates and wages. To maintain a given level of spending in the federal system
outside of Social Security, which is not a consumption good in our model, the federal income tax rate
is change proportionally, as shown in Table VIII. To maintain pay-as-you-go balance inside of Social
Security with a constant tax rate, however, we adjust Social Security beneﬁt su p w a r do rd o w n w a r di na
proportional manner across all households. As a result, some of the direct change in the ﬁrst bendpoint
11See Table 5.A1 in Social Security Administration [2001].is slightly offset; for example, for Run 2, the ﬁrst bendpoint adjusts from 45% to 56.4% in light of
these general-equilibrium offsets. But this approach – rather than changing payroll tax rates – allows
for the cleanest interpretation of the results since these bendpoint parameters still fundamentally alter
the progressivity of the system without altering the statutory rate.
Run 2 shows the effects of a reduction in progressivity relative to the current Social Security sys-
tem. National wealth and labor supply both increase, as does ex-ante welfare. In contrast, Runs 3 and
4 consider more progressive beneﬁt formulas relative to the current system. In Run 3, which increases
progressivity just a modest amount, national wealth and labor supply both decrease, as does ex ante
welfare. In Run 4, where progressivity is increased even more, the losses become even larger in mag-
nitude. Taken together, these results suggest a fairly monotonic relationship between ex-ante welfare
and progressivity: a less progressive beneﬁt structure leads to higher ex-ante welfare. These results are
robust to using a more “ﬁne grid” over the bendpoint parameters as well as somewhat different methods
of adjusting the second and third bendpoints.
The ex-ante superiority of the relatively ﬂatter beneﬁt schedule is surprising at ﬁrst glance, espe-
cially when welfare is measured from the ex-ante position. There are two competition effects taking
place. On one hand, greater amount of progressivity in the beneﬁt formula pools more of the uncer-
tainty that households face, including their initial productivity allocation that is highly correlated with
their subsequent wages. Since these risks are otherwise uninsurable in the private market, a ﬂatter
beneﬁt formula reduces some of this valuable risk sharing. On the other hand, progressivity produces
complicated distortions to labor supply by effectively subsidizing labor supply at lower wages while
increasing effective marginal tax rates at higher wages. The effects of these distortions appear to out-
weigh the beneﬁts of pooling wage uncertainty.
Intuitively, the Social Security beneﬁt calculation already provides some limited risk sharing even
without progressive beneﬁts, simply due to the long computation window that is used to calculate a
person’s pre-retirement wage; low wage realizations can be balanced against higher wage realizations.
While this averaging does little to insure against the uncertainty in a household’s initial productivity
allocation, it still provides some insurance valueover the lifecycle without producing the same effective
tax rates as explicit progressivity, much like how precautionary saving works. Adding additional pro-




able future, signiﬁcant projected shortfalls still remain in the Social Security program. Tough choices,
therefore, will have to be made regarding increasing revenue and/or decreasing beneﬁt s .W eh a v en o t
explicitly modeled the expected shortfalls in this paper; indeed, such imbalances are generally not con-
sistent with standard rational expectations models where budget constraints are assumed to hold. But,
our analysis does suggest that some caution is in order for reforms that focus heavily on making the
beneﬁt structure even more progressive, such as “progressive price indexing,” which has been a quite
popular option debated during the past couple years. Other features of the U.S. – namely, the large
computation period – naturally provide risk sharing but in a less distorting manner.GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
THE WHARTON SCHOOL,U NIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
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PARAMETERS INDEPENDENT OF MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
Coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion γ 2.0
Capital share of output θ 0.30
Depreciation rate of capital stock δ 0.047
Long-term real growth rate μ 0.018
Population growth rate ν 0.010
Probability of receiving bequests η 0.0161
Total factor productivitya A 0.949
a. Total factor productivity is chosen so that w equals 1.0.
TABLE II
PARAMETERS THAT VARY BY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
Time preferencea β 0.981
Consumption shareb α 0.501
Income tax adjustmentc ϕI 0.815
OASDI beneﬁt adjustmentd ϕSS 1.456
a. The capital-GDP ratio is targeted to be 2.74 (r = 6.25 percent) without annuity markets.
b. The average annual working hours are 3,576 per married couple when hmax =8 , 7 6 0 .
c. In a heterogeneous-agent economy, the ratio of income tax revenue to GDP is 0.123.
d. OASDI beneﬁts are pay-as-you-go.
TABLE III
NUMBER OF PEOPLE UNDER AGE 18 LI V I N GI NAMARRIED HOUSEHOLD
Age cohorts Number of children Age cohorts Number of children
20-24 0.824 50-54 0.576
25-29 0.957 55-59 0.196
30-34 1.512 60-64 0.109
35-39 1.759 65-69 0.084
40-44 1.700 70-74 0.025
45-49 1.152 75-79 0.028
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2003 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).TABLE IV
WORKING ABILITIES OF A HOUSEHOLD (IN U.S. DOLLARS PER HOUR)
Percentile Age cohorts
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
e1 0-20th 6.59 6.79 7.23 7.58 6.63 7.06
e2 20-40th 9.13 11.90 12.99 14.13 13.65 14.01
e3 40-60th 11.13 15.15 17.63 19.43 18.76 19.84
e4 60-80th 13.89 18.79 23.72 25.98 26.56 26.51
e5 80-90th 17.89 23.07 31.94 36.66 37.30 34.38
e6 90-95th 22.17 28.75 44.87 50.36 51.30 43.69
e7 95-99th 28.92 37.02 70.45 90.33 74.86 76.14
e8 99-100th 50.99 68.56 111.40 180.53 211.09 239.59
Percentile Age cohorts
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79
e1 0-20th 6.45 2.76 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
e2 20-40th 14.02 11.90 4.54 0.01 0.00 0.00
e3 40-60th 20.46 17.75 12.55 3.56 0.00 0.00
e4 60-80th 27.89 25.24 20.40 12.35 1.64 0.35
e5 80-90th 37.71 32.90 32.30 22.41 7.45 10.15
e6 90-95th 47.60 43.79 42.47 34.78 12.52 20.57
e7 95-99th 81.61 68.69 57.48 47.01 19.22 36.73
e8 99-100th 247.47 443.14 89.02 101.28 100.08 51.30
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2003 PSID.TABLE V
MARGINAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES IN 2001 (MARRIED HOUSEHOLD,F ILED JOINTLY)
Taxable income Marginal income tax rate (%)
$0 – $45,200 15.0 × ϕI
$45,200 – $109,250 28.0 × ϕI
$109,250 – $166,500 31.0 × ϕI
$166,500 – $297,350 36.0 × ϕI
$297,350 – 39.6 × ϕI
TABLE VI
MARGINAL PAYROLL TAX RATES IN 2001
Taxable labor Marginal tax rate (%)
income per worker OASDI HI
$0 – $80,400 12.4 × ϕP 2.9
$80,400 – 0.0 × ϕP 2.9
Note: The payroll tax adjustment factor ϕP equals 1.0 in the baseline economy.
TABLE VII
OASDI REPLACEMENT RATES IN 2001
AIME (b/12) Marginal replacement rate (%)
$0 – $561 90.0 × ϕSS
$561 – $3,381 32.0 × ϕSS
$3,381 – 15.0 × ϕSS
Note: The OASDI beneﬁt adjustment factor ϕSS is set so that the OASDI is pay-as-you-go in the base-
line economies.TABLE VIII
PERCENT CHANGE IN SELECTED STEADY-STATE MACRO VARIABLES AND WELFARE RELATIVE
TO BASELINE
GNP National Labor Interest Wage Income Ex-Ante
Run #a wealth supply rate rate tax Welfare
rateb
1 00 0 000 0
Bendpoints
90 / 32 / 15
2 0.55 0.45 0.60 0.18 -0.04 -0.95 0.04
Bendpoints
56.4 / 40.1 / 18.8
3
Bendpoints -0.36 -0.26 -0.41 -0.18 0.04 0.65 -0.02
112.2 / 26.6 / 12.5
4 -0.63 -0.45 -0.70 -0.30 0.07 1.11 -0.04
Bendpoints
127.8 / 22.7 / 10.7
a. Closed economy, no private annuity markets.
b. The proportional change in marginal tax rates across all households.